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Abstract 
Quality management is an important function for viable production networks. In order to qualify decision makers to understand the 
fundamental principles of quality management in production networks, a game-based simulation and learning environment is developed, which 
can furthermore be used to understand how human factors influence the quality of decisions in complex production networks. Previous studies 
have shown that underlying factors must exist, which predict the players' performance. It is currently unexplored, which factors are contributing 
to high performance. To deeper investigate which human factors are critical for supply chain success and to further refine the quality 
management game a series of studies were examined. As expected, expertise had a great impact on performance, however contrary to the 
expectations cognitive skills had none. The refined decision dashboard, with seamlessly integrated self-adapting visualizations on key 
performance indicators, had a significant positive impact on game performance. The studies suggest that the developed game is a valuable 
contribution for the qualification of quality managers, as the quality of decision increased. 
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1. Quality management in production networks 
Quality management is an interdisciplinary function in 
industries and organizations. It aims at controlling the 
complex interplay of heterogeneous processes in a highly 
dynamic environment. That is, quality management gives a 
contribution to the decision making process on all 
entrepreneurial levels from the macroscopic perspective of 
production networks and supply chains down to the shop floor 
level, where product and process parameters have to be 
controlled and adapted in order to maintain stability and 
capability [1]. Ever since the foundation and successful 
establishment of the total quality management principle, 
quality management was directly connected to entrepreneurial 
success [2]. Hence, quality management offers methods, 
solutions and tools to support decision making processes in 
many different functions and fields.  
Quality management units are typically in lead, or process 
owner for several entrepreneurial processes [3]: 
1. Quality politics and strategy planning 
2. Coordination of quality management methods 
3. Standardization of documentation 
4. Continuous improvement processes 
5. Quality and inspection planning 
6. Quality control and assurance 
7. Supplier assessment and development 
8. Corrective action, change, complaint and defect 
processes 
9. Auditing 
10. Surveying customer satisfaction  
While all these quality management processes are playing 
an important role throughout the organization, the processes 
four to ten can have a direct impact on the value stream; they 
are not only management or supporting processes, but are 
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directly connected to the customer, or the value stream. 
Hence, quality management eventually has a significant 
interface to the work and tasks of other entrepreneurial 
management disciplines in the value stream such as 
production, logistics and supply chain management and 
purchasing.  
2. Analyzing the interfaces of quality management with 
direct functions 
In order to understand the interface between the 
management disciplines in supply chains and quality 
management, the methods and target systems of these 
disciplines were analyzed and reviewed. Logistics, purchasing 
and supply chain management are not strictly differentiated in 
literature. Therefore a process oriented approach was selected, 
defining the main tasks of these functions which are directly 
connected to the management of the value stream of 
production networks: 
x Supply chain design 
x Demand planning 
x Planning of procurement and purchase 
x Inventory control and management 
x Supply Chain and production planning and control 
(PPC)  
2.1.1. Quality management and supply chain design 
Supply chain design covers all tasks connected from the 
identification via contracting over to the phase-out of 
suppliers [4] [5]. In order to identify suppliers and possible 
locations for the production networks various qualitative and 
quantitative decision methodologies and algorithms especially 
from operations research can be used. These methods are 
considering various factors (e.g. price, distance, place, 
company size), which have to be considered when decisions 
about the supply chain design are made [5]. Quality 
management is giving different contributions to these decision 
factors. Within the process of supplier development and 
auditing, quality management has the task to assess the 
system, product and process quality level of suppliers and 
negotiate quality assurance agreements between the producer 
and its suppliers. Moreover, quality managers are in charge to 
run complaint processes to the suppliers using 8D-reports as 
the state-of the-art methodology [6]. 
2.1.2. Quality management and demand planning 
The demand planning process uses several forecasting 
methods in order to predict the customer demand for the 
supply chain. Based on these demands the capacity of the 
production plants is planned [5]. Especially the processes of 
quality management which are directly connected to the 
customer, such as complaint, claim and call-back management 
are processes which have a significant influence on customer 
satisfaction and eventually on sales volume [6]. 
2.1.3. Quality management and procurement planning 
Methods such as the ABC/ XYZ analysis are the basis for 
the decision about the sourcing policy of supply chain 
management [4] [5]. Sourcing policies are differentiated by 
the trigger point of the sourcing (reorder-point vs. frequency) 
and the elaboration of the order quantity (order-up-to-level vs. 
economic order quantity). Nevertheless modern sourcing 
policies have to consider the inspection policy and the 
supplier quality level: A just-in-time delivery with the parts 
shipped to line would be fatal, if the supplier had issues in 
process or product quality [5].  
2.1.4. Quality management and inventory control 
The task of inventory control is to define the necessary 
level of stock in order to reach the desired service level, while 
inventory costs should be minimized [4] [5]. Depending on 
the quality level of production processes and the scrap rate, 
quality management is giving an important input to the 
inventory planning process. On shop floor level, quality and 
inventory control have to establish concepts which guarantee 
that defect parts, or parts for rework or scrap are not confused 
with work-in-progress inventory.  
2.1.5. Quality management and production planning and 
control 
The Aachen PPC model is a well known regulation 
framework for the tasks and processes of production 
management [7]. Quality management processes such as 
inspection planning, quality control and assurance, and 
continuous improvement have a significant interdependency 
with these production management processes. Based on the 
quality and inspection planning, inspection control work 
places are designed and integrated in the value stream of the 
shop floor. Faulty parts and disturbances of machines can 
cause severe changes and potential turbulences within the 
production program. Moreover quality management 
contributes various optimization methods such as the Design-
of-Experiments (DoE) for effectiveness and efficiency of 
machines and processes on shop floor [6].  
2.2. Challenges for the integration of the tasks 
Nowadays the analyzed interfaces are often implemented 
in production IT-systems, which support the work flows and 
decision makers. These systems have a modular structure, 
meaning that the described processes can be decoupled from 
each other. To give an example: The purchasing and ordering 
function of an ERP system does not necessary exchange 
information with the CAQ or MES module about current 
scrap and failure rates within the production, but sets the 
fraction of faulty parts as a constant variable in the system. 
According to expert interviews, the integration of the methods 
and interfaces in theory and IT-system can bring a significant 
benefit for production companies but might also increase the 
complexity for decision makers in quality, production, 
logistics and supply chain management. Hence, cause-and-
effect chains which were primarily taught within the IT-
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modules of the functions should be interlinked and connected 
between the disciplines, without increasing the complexity of 
the system, perceived by the decision makers. Therefore not 
only the theory and production concept need to be considered 
but also the role of the human as the decision maker in 
complex production systems, when new concepts for quality 
and production management are designed or connected. 
3. Game based learning in quality and production 
management 
In order to train and support human decision making, 
business games can provide an ideal arena for training and 
simulation since no penalties or damages resulting from bad 
decisions have to be feared. Similar to a flight simulator, the 
decision maker is confronted with a challenging situation 
recommending fast meaningful decision making.  
Production and quality management is facing a long 
tradition in business gaming in order to support the managers 
in their daily work and increase decision efficiency. The Beer 
distribution game is a powerful example for well known 
games among supply chain managers [8]. Goldratt’s game 
envisions the main idea about the theory of constraints to 
quality managers.  
3.1. Beer distribution game 
The Beer distribution game was designed by MIT 
professors to demonstrate the Bullwhip effect which was 
discovered and described based on a Pampers production of 
Proctor and Gamble [8]. The Bullwhip effect describes [9] 
x “how small changes in retail sales can lead to large 
swings in factory reduction, 
x how reduced delays may fail to improve management 
decisions significantly, 
x how a factory manager may find himself unable to fill 
orders although at all times able to produce more goods 
than are being sold to consumers, and 
x how and advertisement policy can have a magnificent 
effect on production variations.”  
In the game four players are taking the role of the retailer, 
wholesale, regional warehouse and factory within one linear 
supply chain. Each player has to decide about the order 
quantity for the next game period. The overall target is to 
operate the supply chain at a minimum cost level. Studies 
show several measures in order to reduce the amplification of 
the Bullwhip-effect significantly. Many measures require a 
collaborative behavior of the supply chain steps such as 
sharing the information about point-of-sale data. 
3.2. Goldratt’s game 
Goldratt’s Game simulates a production line which is 
imperiled by fluctuations [11]. In this example, the production 
line consists of two workstations (station 1 and station 2). Fig. 
1 illustrates the game set design. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Goldratt’s game 
The incoming goods for station 1 arrive from a supplier 
with an unlimited inventory and the incoming goods for 
station 2 are produced and delivered by station 1. In order to 
determine the number of the demanded goods, an ideal dice is 
tossed in each round once, first for station 1 and then for 
station 2. A new round starts after the transportation of goods 
from the supplier to station 1 and from station 1 to station 2 is 
carried out. If there are not enough goods at station 1 to meet 
the demand from station 2, then all the goods will be 
transported. Fluctuations of the production output are caused 
by dice toss. 
3.3. The need for a new Quality Intelligence (QI)-Game 
Comparing the concepts of the two games points out that 
quality managers cannot make decisions in the Goldratt’s 
Game but are reduced to game automats, simply representing 
different levels of a linear supply chain and rolling the dice in 
order to simulate variation in part supply. Moreover, the role 
of the human character and user diversity has hardly been 
studied for quality management before, as recent research on 
human behavior in supply chain systems presents. Therefore 
the next research steps for the quality management in supply 
chain steps should be  
1 – the development of a game and simulation concept for 
quality management and planning in supply chains (Chapter 
4). 
2 – the evaluation of the game design and the effect of human 
behavior and characteristics in the new developed game 
environment (Chapter 5). 
4. Concept and Design of the QI-game 
When companies success is measured in profit, quality 
management has a significant impact according to the total 
quality management concept [6].  
 
ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐ ൌ ሺ݌ െ ܿ௩ሻ ή ݊ െ ܥ௙ 
 
While the product quality perspective is targeting the 
maximization of price (p) and sales volume (n), process 
quality focusses on the minimization of variable costs (ܿ௩)and 
fixed costs ሺܥ௙ ). Hence the QI-game should consider the 
described key processes of quality management and simulate 
their contribution to the overall profit. 
Station 1 Station 2Supplier for 
station 1 with an 
endless inventory
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4.1. Implementation of the value stream in supply chains 
In order to built a game concept for a supply chain the Beer 
distribution game and Goldratt’s game can serve as blueprints. 
Therefore, the players will take the role of one production unit 
in the supply chain. For the demonstration of the effects of 
decisions in quality management processes the ideal 
abstraction level of the value stream has to be defined. The 
game should be applicable to a wide range of players with and 
without expert knowledge in quality or production 
management. Therefore, the resolution of each process step 
should not be too detailed, choosing a similar aggregation 
level to the steps of the Beer distribution game and Goldratt’s 
game. Therefore each player will have to manage a process 
containing an inventory for incoming goods and a production 
process. Each supply chain step will receive the incoming 
goods from a single supplier delivering to just one customer.  
4.2. Connecting the key processes of quality management to 
the value stream 
While the game concept of the value stream is only little 
different to those of the Beer distribution game and Goldratt’s 
game, the player has to get the possibility to make decisions 
in the most important processes owned by quality 
management, which again have to be connected to the overall 
profit. Therefore the earlier discussed processes will be 
implemented in the game (see also Fig. 2). 
  
 
Fig. 2. The QI decision cockpit 
4.2.1. Implementation of inspection planning for incoming 
goods (1)  
In order to assure the product quality of incoming goods 
from the supplier, the player can decide about his inspection 
policy. When the player increases his invest in inspections, 
test efforts and sample sizes will be increased and the 
probability to find faulty goods from the supplier will rise. 
Faulty supplier parts which enter the production system of a 
player are more likely to be transformed into faulty products 
which will cause internal defects or complaints if the product 
is delivered to the customer. Hence the player has to 
understand and make decision about the trade-off between 
higher inspection costs and lower production yields and 
higher costs for claims due to customer complaints. 
4.2.2. Implementation of Continuous Improvement Processes 
and Production Quality Control (2) 
Similar to the decision about the inspection policy, the 
player will have to decide about his policy for internal 
processes. Therefore he can invest into the quality level of his 
own production processes. If invests are low, the yield and 
final product quality will fall causing higher complaints and 
claims by the customer, while high invests will compromise 
the overall profitability. Similar to the decision about  the 
inspection policy, the player is facing another trade-off 
decision between preventive and corrective quality costs. 
4.2.3. Order and inventory policy (3) 
In addition the player has to decide about his inventory 
and order policy, considering the scraped products of the 
supplier and faulty products from his own production. While 
the parameters for the management of orders are similar to the 
Beer game, rapid changes in demand will not occur, leaving 
the focus on the decisions of the game on the quality policies. 
Nevertheless the player has to consider scrapped parts due to 
low production quality or blocked parts due to poor supplier 
product quality, when he makes the ordering decisions. 
4.2.4. Implementation of problem management and claim and 
complaint processes (5) 
Faulty supplier parts identified by the incoming goods 
inspection will be complained at the supplier. Hence, the 
player will get credit for the complained parts. Moreover, the 
supplier will learn from the complainted parts. That is, a 
supplier receiving no complaints due to low inspection policy 
of his customer will deteriorate his product quality level in 
order to reduce his own costs. 
Furthermore, the player will receive complaints from the 
customer. The complaints will increase quality costs and 
decrease overall profits. Furthermore, lower customer 
satisfaction can lead to decreasing customer demand.  
These processes will run automatically as consequences of 
the players inspection and production quality policy. 
4.2.5. Supplier development, auditing and customer 
satisfaction studies (4,6) 
In supply chain management the supplier development will 
use audits, supplier development and customer surveys to 
assess and enhance the quality level of the supplier and 
measure customer satisfaction. These measures are usually 
used in order to decrease the need for costly in-line 
inspections  (4.2.1) and adapt production quality control 
(4.2.2). In order to reduce the complexity of the game for the 
player, he will not get to decide about the assessment, but will 
play two games with and without the additional information 
about supplier quality level and customer satisfaction. These 
information could be compared to the information about 
point-of-sales data in the beer game.  
Supplier Production
Manufacturer
Transport of
parts
Transport of 
products
Order and 
inventory policy
Investment for the 
incoming goods inspection
Investment for the production 
quality and Contineuous
Improvement
3
1 2
4
Supplier development 
and customer audit
Customer
Complaint and Claim 
Management5
Customer surveys
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4.3. Implementation of the QI-game 
Fig. 2 shows the implemented decision cockpit for one 
player of the QI-game. The upper half is showing the 
described information and key performance indicators for the 
inspection at goods receipt, inventory and logistics, and 
production and sales planning. The player can shift the slider 
in the quality management decision board in order to adapt 
inspection and production quality policies and decide on the 
orders. The implemented traffic lights are optional features 
which could serve as early indicators for the true state of the 
supplier quality level and customer satisfaction, while the 
internal measured quality depends on the policy decisions of 
the players and might contain systematic bias. 
 
 
Fig. 2. The QI decision cockpit 
Similar to the Beer distribution game, the next step was to 
find the right parameters for the functions and cause-and-
effect chains. While the functions can be deduced using an 
analytical  approach, the parameter level will have a huge 
effect on the sensitivity of the model. In order to define the 
level of the parameters pre-studies were conducted. As for the 
Beer game, the player will be challenged with a disruptive 
change of the supplier product quality and or his production 
quality. Therefore, it can be trained to adapt the inspection 
and production quality policies to severe changes in the 
supply chain or the production system. 
5. Evaluation 
After the implementation of the QI-game as a publicly 
available web application a formal user study was conducted. 
The goal of this study was to evaluate the game model, to 
understand how players interact with the game, how different 
settings within the game model effect the company’s 
performance and to investigate whether player profiles also 
have an influence on the performance of the simulated 
company. In the following a highly focused review of the 
results is given; an in-depth presentation of this and a series of 
accompanying sub-studies can be found in [12], [13]. The 
evaluation of the game was guided by four formal hypotheses: 
H1: The game is useable in the sense that the players can 
achieve reliable results. 
H2: The company’s performance is influenced by the 
simulated quality of the supplier (drop vs. no drop) and the 
quality of the own production (drop vs. no drop). 
H3: The presentation of indicators for the supplier’s quality 
and for the internal production quality increases the 
company’s performance. 
H4: The player profile influences the performance of the 
simulated company. 
5.1. Experimental Setup 
To validate the hypotheses, we designed a formal experiment, 
in which participants played two consecutive rounds of the 
QI-Game under different experimental conditions. Before the 
game a pre-survey assessed the subjects’ demographic data 
(age, gender, vocational background) and various personality 
traits. After the game a post-survey captured the player’s 
strategy, perceived difficulty, as well as an overall evaluation 
of the game. 
5.1.1. Independent Variables 
As independent variable a characterization of the player’s 
personality was used. It was modeled by the Five Factor 
Model (FFM), which describes the human personality by the 
five dimensions openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, 
agreeableness, and neuroticism. To assess the participants’ 
personality traits a 20-item questionnaire by Rammstedt [14] 
was used. Furthermore, self-efficacy in interacting with 
technology (SET) was measured, as it was found to have a 
substantial impact on user’s efficiency, effectivity and 
satisfaction within a wide range of domains, in which users 
interact with technology [15]–[17]. 
5.1.2. Experimental Variables 
The complexity of the simulation was controlled by two 
between-subjects repeated-measures factors: First, a factor 
indicating a drop or the absence of a drop of the supplier’s 
product quality by 30% after the 10th round. Second, a factor 
indicating a drop or the absence of a drop of the internal 
production quality by 30% after the 10th round. 
The visibility of indicators for the supplier’s quality and 
the internal production quality was controlled as a within-
subject variable. Either both indicators or no indicator were 
visible. If displayed, the indicators were represented as traffic 
lights within the game environment. 
5.1.3. Depended Variables 
As the dependent variable the cumulated profit after each 
round was evaluated. Note that the parameterization of the in-
game costs and profits is reasonable, but still arbitrary. Hence, 
the values presented below should not be interpreted as 
absolute values, but as indicators for relative complexity of 
the game. Furthermore, the total playing time for each round 
and the number of changes of the company’s controls was 
measured.  
Cost for Inspection in the
last period:
Refunds from complaints:
Σ=
Inventory costs:
Order Costs:
Lost Sales Penalty:
Σ=
Cost of production:
Cost for complaints and
claims
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-30000
-20000
-10000
0
10000
20000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Monate
Profit Profit:
Costs of Quality Inspection
Cost of Production
Inventory Costs
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5.1.4. Sample description 
Participants were recruited on social networks, by email or 
posters in lecture halls. In total 127 participants completed the 
experiment, of which 97 are male (23.6%) and 30 are female 
(23.6%). The sample is rather young with a mean age of 27.7 
years (σ=7.2 years). Over half (58.6%) of the participants 
reported a university degree as their highest educational 
attainment, followed by a high school diploma (39.7%). A 
third of the participants reported previous knowledge in 
quality management (67.7%) or business management 
(65.9%). Regarding the Five Factor Model the sample is 
comparable to the reference sample of Rammstedt. 
5.2. Results 
The data was analyzed with uni- and multivariate analyses 
of variance (M/ANOVA) and bivariate correlations. Pillai’s 
trace values (V) were used for the significance in multivariate 
tests. The level of significance was set to p < .05. The 
remainder of the section is structured as follows: First, the 
commonalities of both rounds are presented. Second, the 
impact of the drops in supply and production quality is shown. 
Third, the influence of visible quality indicators is quantified. 
At last, the influence of human factors on game performance 
is revealed. 
5.2.1. Effect of Repetition 
There is a strong correlation between the player’s profits in 
first and second round of the game (r=.730, p<.01). Hence, 
players who achieved a high/low profit in the first round of 
the game, also achieved a high/low profit in the second round 
of the game. Furthermore, the average profit increases 
significantly in the second round of the game (F(1, 126) = 
36.6, p<.01). In the first round the average profit was M=-19.0 
(σ=258.5) money units and it increased to M=76.6 (σ=218.3) 
money units in the second round. 
5.2.2. Effect of game complexity 
The experimentally controlled game complexity had a 
significant effect on the company’s profits, although only the 
drop of the internal production quality is significant (F(1, 122) 
= 12.342, p=.001<.05), while the drop of the supplier’s 
quality is not. As expected, the highest profits were achieved 
under stable conditions were no drops in the supplier’s quality 
and the internal production quality occurred (M=148.5, 
σ=128.). If the supplier’s quality drops, the result is slightly 
worse (M=132.9, σ=81.2). A drop of the internal production 
quality led to drastically reduced profits of M=-1.3 (σ=316.4) 
if the supplier’s quality stayed constant and M=11.5 
(σ=236.8) if the supplier’s quality also droped (see Table 1). 
 
 
Table 1. Average profits for each of the four game complexity conditions. 
  Supplier’s quality 
  no drop drop 
Internal 
production 
quality 
no drop M=148.5, σ=128-0 M=132.9, σ=81.2 
drop M=-1.3, σ=316.4 M=11.5, σ=236.8 
5.2.3. Effect of presentation of quality indicators 
The availability of quality indicators for the supplier’s 
quality and the internal production quality had no significant 
impact on the average profits (p=.537, n.s.). 
5.2.4. Effect of personality traits 
None of the personality traits from the Five Factor Model 
had a significant impact on game performance. Furthermore, 
self-efficacy in interaction with technology (SET) only 
marginally influences the average profits (r=.163, p=.084 
<.1), which contradicts the previous study on Forrester’s Beer 
Distribution Game [17]. Also, prior expertise and domain 
knowledge in either quality management or business 
administration had no significant impact on game 
performance. As the average results are higher for high SET 
values and high domain knowledge, one can assume, that 
significant difference might occur with larger sample sizes or 
when the large variance of the average profits it reduced by 
optimizing the game model. 
Regarding the player’s interaction with the game 
environment, two observations were made. First, the time 
spent in the first round correlated with the average profit 
made (r=.301, p=.001 < .05). However, this effect fades for 
the second round of the game (r=.142, p=.112>.05). Second, 
the number of adjustments on the company’s investments had 
a significant impact on the company’s profit (r=.303, p 
=.001<.05). Also, different interaction patterns – specifically 
an efficient reaction to changing quality levels – between high 
and low achievers were discovered. Those are presented in 
detail in [13]. 
The player’s strategy (assessed after playing the game) had 
a significant impact on performance (r=.370, p<.01), with 
players with a high quality orientation achieving higher 
results (M=136.1, σ=96.3) than players with a low orientation 
towards quality (M=21.1, σ=280.4). 
6. Discussion 
The high correlation between the profits in the first and 
second round of the game reveal two important findings: 
First, the player’s performance is relatively stable, meaning 
that there are players who perform better and players who 
perform worse. This indicates that underlying human factors 
that explain player’s performance. Second, the stability of the 
results furthermore suggests, that the game model itself yields 
stable results. In summary, this result alone is a strong 
evidence for both hypothesis H1 and H4. However, the 
current study failed at constructing a model for explaining the 
human factors behind differences in game performance.  
The randomly assigned game complexity had an impact on 
the average profit of the company, indicating that hypothesis 
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H2 holds true. Still, we suspected that the condition with 
quality drops on both sides (supplier and internal) would be 
the most difficult condition, which was not the case within 
this study. We learned, that the impact of a drop of the 
supplier’s quality is easier to identify and to react on than a 
drop of the internal production quality, which frequently 
remained unnoticed, reducing the overall profits. 
To our surprise the traffic lights indicating the supplier’s 
quality and the internal production quality did not influence 
the player’s performance. Hence, this study suggests that 
hypothesis H3 has to be rejected.  However, informal 
interviews conducted after the experiment suggest, that many 
players had well understood the indicator for the supplier’s 
quality, but did not sufficiently understood the concept of 
internal production quality and were misguided by its visual 
indicator. Further studies will need to investigate this issue by 
providing a better explanation of the indicator’s functioning 
which will then probably also lead to significant positive 
effects of the availability of quality indicators. 
Using games as a tool to facilitate learning is getting 
increasingly popular, also in professional domains [18]. 
Within this study the participants gained expertise and learned 
to control the simulated company more efficiently and 
increased the average profits between both rounds of the 
game. Furthermore, they post survey revealed, that the 
participants’ awareness for quality management increased and 
that the attention shifted towards quality management 
techniques within the game. 
Summarizing, the study reveals that the QI-Game is both, a 
valuable tool to investigate human decision making in 
complex logistic scenarios and also a fun and highly effective 
tool that can be used in vocational training for quality 
managers and supply chain managers. 
7. Limitations, Summary and Outlook 
We observed that the key depended variable “average 
profit” features large variance, hence many of the non-
significant results may yield significant results if the sample 
size is increased, if the game model is optimized and if more 
rigid statistical methods are applied. 
To our surprise, the availability of quality indicators did 
not increase the player’s performance in the game, although 
they were conceptualized as an instrument to quickly identify 
the source of changing product quality. As argued in the 
results section, this should be addressed in a refined briefing 
before the game and then the effect of quality indicators 
should be reevaluated. 
The current game model is reduced to the control of one 
sort of products. In reality quality managers and supply chain 
managers have to overview a large and more diverse set of 
products and materials with varying replacement times. 
Therefore, further studies will need to address this increased 
complexity with a more realistic test environment. 
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